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This Essay is a necessarily brief survey of some of the proposals
that were discussed at the conference on enhancing the accountability
of lawyers for unprofessional conduct. Many of the projects to
improve lawyer professionalism are well designed, modest in scope,
and aimed at addressing real problems. This represents a positive trend
away from some of the vaporous and woolly discourse that has given
the professionalism movement a bad name, but the sheer number and
diversity of individuals and groups interested in lawyer
professionalism ensures that it will continue to be exceedingly difficult
to pin down a definition of professionalism with sufficient specificity
to measure the effect of various proposals for increasing the
accountability of lawyers for unprofessional conduct. As a sometime
observer of the professionalism movement, I am struck by the
seemingly limitless variety of sins that are encompassed by the rubric
of unprofessional conduct. Professionalism is a capacious concept-an
"umbrella" as one Organization calls it'-encompassing practicallythe
whole range of lawyering traits, from individual characteristics such
as competence and civility, to large-scale systemic issues such as
distributional justice and diversity. Looking at the concept positively,
professionalism can be defined as including one or more of the
following attributes2 :
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University.
I. GA. CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, How CAN PROFESS-
IONALISM BE INSTITUTIONALIZED?: THE GEORGIA EXPERIENCE 24 (2002) [hereinafter
GA. COMM'N REPORT].
2. For some lists of the characteristics of professionalism, see, for example, N. C. Chief
Justice's Comm'n on Professionalism, at
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/Pmfessionalism/Defaultasp (last updated April
17, 2002 ); PROFESSIONALISM PRIMER AND PROBLEM-SOLVING GUIDE 5 (Roy Stuckey et. al.
eds., 2002); THOMAS M. COOLEY PROFESSIONALISM COMM., PROFESSIONALISM PLAN:
PROFESSIONALISM TAUGHT, LEARNED, AND LIVED IN LAW SCHOOL (2002) [hereinafter
COOLEY COMM. REPORT]; GA. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 24-27passim.
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* Performing pro bono service or working to improve access to
justice for underserved (poor and middle-class) populations.
" Civility, etiquette, and respect for other lawyers, clients, and other
participants in the justice system.
" Refraining from abusive practices, such as evasive discovery
responses, deliberately causing inconvenience through scheduling,
and name-calling at depositions.
" Honesty, candor, and trustworthiness, including keeping one's
word when dealing with opposing counsel, not misrepresenting
the law or facts to the court, and dealing forthrightly with clients.
" Competence, in the sense of having received a good initial legal
education including emphasis on practical skills, and maintenance
of a high level of practical skills and knowledge, often with the
assistance of continuing legal education programs.
" Making an effort to reform the law or judicial administration, as
well as to strengthen the rule of law and individual rights.
" Seeing one's role as a problem-solver, rather than someone who
exploits dissension for personal gain.
" Independence, either from the state or from powerful clients.
" Less emphasis on profit-making and commercialism, in
comparison with craft virtues or "internal" rewards of the practice
of law.
" Good client service, such as returning phone calls promptly and
working diligently on client matters.
" Attention to diversity issues, both with respect to clients and the
profession, including refraining from bias in one's professional
conduct.
" A balance among one's occupational and private lives, leading to
greaterjob satisfaction and a lower rate of some of the pathologies
observed in populations of lawyers, such as mental health
problems and substance abuse.
* A matter of having good moral character, a praiseworthy set of
dispositions, or a well developed faculty ofjudgment, rather than
merely acting in compliance with enforceable disciplinary rules,
often referred to as a "floor" of minimally acceptable conduct.
Parenthetically, I would like to make a plea for a little more rigor
in the use of concepts like professionalism and ethics. Many
commentators identify "ethics" with a minimum standard of obligatory
conduct and "professionalism" with what the lawyer should do, but
1028
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which is not made mandatory by enforceable disciplinary rules.3 In this
vein, one frequently encounters the metaphor of floors (minimal,
enforceable rules) and ceilings (aspirations) in discussions of
professionalism.4 This is a common enough distinction, but it is useful
to point out that the academic discipline of ethics (traditionally the
concern of philosophers and theologians, but recently also of interest
to cognitive psychologists, feminist critics, and others) is oriented
toward standards of right and wrong that do not depend on enforceable
rules.5 Many standards of professionalism may actually be obligatory
for lawyers as a matter of philosophical ethics. In the lingo of
philosophical ethics, standards that are not obligatory, but are
nevertheless morally praiseworthy, are supererogatory. This category
corresponds to Judge Veasey's discussion of ideals that are a "higher
calling" for professionals.6 There is a substantial volume of thoughtful
scholarship from professional ethicists on questions germane to the
subject of this conference, but lawyers often misinterpret these
arguments by equating ethics with legally enforceable rules. Moreover,
as I suggested, some aspects of professionalism may be ethically
3. GA. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 55; E. Norman Veasey, Remarks at the
Professionalism Conference in Charleston, South Carolina, Enhancing the
Accountability of Lawyers for Unprofessional Conduct (Sept. 28,2002), in Transcript,
54 S.C. L. REV. 897, 897 (2003) [hereinafter Veasey Remarks].
4. See, e.g., Blan Teagle, Remarks at the Professionalism Conference in Charles-
ton, South Carolina, Enhancing the Accountability of Lawyers for Unprofessional
Conduct (Sept. 28,2002), in Transcript, 54 S.C. L. REV. 897,920 (2003) [hereinafter
Teagle Remarks] (discussing professionalism and ethics); Veasey Remarks, supra note
3, at 897 (discussing professionalism and ethics standards); and Sally Winkler,
Remarks at the Professionalism Conference in Charleston, South Carolina, Enhancing
the Accountability of Lawyers for Unprofessional Conduct (Sept. 28, 2002), in
Transcript, 54 S.C. L. REV. 897, 912 (2003) (discussing the role of a professionalism
commission).
5. To make matters even more complicated, "professionalism" is also a term
employed in sociology, in which it is defined positively or descriptively, not
normatively, and used to identify occupations as professions. On this kind of definition,
characteristics of professions include a requirement of substantial intellectual training
and the making of complex judgments; control by members of the occupation over
licensure and entry; the necessity of trust in the professional-client relationship because
professional expertise is inaccessible to the client; self-regulation; and a sense that
professional prerogatives will be exercised in the public interest, not for the self-
serving ends of the professional. See, e.g., A. B. A. Comm'n on Professionalism,
"... In the Spirit of Public Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer
Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 261 (1986) [hereinafter STANLEY COMM'N REPORT]
(adopting definition of Eliot Friedson, a prominent sociologist of professions). For a
survey of other sociological definitions of professionalism, see RICHARD L. ABEL,
AMERICAN LAWYERS 14-39 (1989); Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek,
Introduction, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS INTHE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION I (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
6. Veasey Remarks, supra note 3, at 897.
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required if ethics is understood to proceed from a critical standpoint
independent of the legal rules that in fact exist. The last section of this
Essay focuses on arguments of this nature.
Given this diverse set of characteristics of professionalism, it
should not be surprising that reform proposals have been equally
varied.7 Professionalism reform groups advocate an array of solutions
including better law school orientation programs, ongoing training,
and programming designed specifically for teaching ethical reflection
and judgment; continuing legal education focused on the aspirational
dimension of legal ethics, the more mundane skills such as law
practice management, and the deficiencies that tend to cause
malpractice actions and disciplinary grievances against lawyers;'
"bridging the gap" programs to introduce new lawyers to practice
skills they may not have acquired in law school; promulgation of
voluntary creeds and oaths that may be displayed prominently to which
lawyers can subscribe;9 development of more specific guidelines for
particular practice areas such as litigation; 10 mentoring programs to
acculturate new lawyers into an authentically professional style of
practice; informal meetings among local lawyers andjudges to discuss
professionalism issues; assistance for lawyers with substance abuse or
mental health difficulties; 1 increased pro bono service by lawyers;
enhanced use of alternative dispute resolution procedures; better
enforcement of existing disciplinary rules; and public recognition of
lawyers who exhibit the virtue of professionalism.
7. For lists of these proposals, see CONFERENCE OF CHIEFJUSTICES, A NATIONAL
ACTION PLAN ON LAWYER CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONALISM (1999) [hereinafter CHIEF
JUSTICES' ACTION PLAN], available at
http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/natlplan/natlactionplan.htm (last visited January 9, 2003);
PROFESSIONALISM COMM., A.B.A. SECTIONOF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE
BAR, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM 27-34 (1996) [hereinafter
"PROFESSIONALISM COMM. REPORT"]; STANLEY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 5.
8. CHIEF JUSTICES' ACTION PLAN, supra note 7, at 26.
9. GA. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 25. For example, the Atlanta Bar
Pledge is displayed at counsel table in courtrooms in Atlanta and repeated at all Atlanta
Bar functions. Id. at 45.
10. For instance, the Trial Lawyers Section of the Florida Bar has a set of
guidelines respecting issues such as scheduling and continuances, service of papers,
and conduct in depositions. See CTR. FOR PROFESSIONALISM, FLA. BAR, GUIDELINES
FOR PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, http://www.flabar.org/ (last visited January 3, 2003).
Many of the guidelines simply restate existing rules of law governing lawyers, such as
the prohibition on communicating ex parte with the court or making misrepresentations
to the court or opposing counsel. Id. Others are considerably more aspirational, such
as the guideline providing that "[a] lawyer should advise clients against the strategy of
[refusing to grant] time extensions for the sake of appearing 'tough." Id.
I1. CHIEF JUSTICES' ACTION PLAN, supra note 7, at 28.
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Naturally, some organizations are more focused on particular
attributes ofprofessionalism than others. For example, the Professional
Reform Initiative has adopted "restoration of lawyers' reputation for
truthfulness and honesty [as] its signature issue."' 2 And the Best
Practices Project of the Clinical Legal Educators Association is aimed,
as one might expect, at improving education and preparation of
lawyers for practice. However, if there is one issue that seems to
dominate many discussions of professionalism, it is civility. 3 The
story of Joe Jamail's cursing at the Delaware deposition ("Don't 'Joe'
me, asshole") has by now become a standard trope in the
professionalism literature.' 4 1 tend to agree with those who believe the
emphasis on civility is at best a distraction and at worst antithetical to
some of the core values of lawyering. It is a distraction because
incivility is generally a symptom of some underlying cause, which
should be the focus of reform initiatives. For example, if lawyers are
obnoxious to one another in depositions, the problem may be that
discovery in a case has become out of control, or that party-controlled
discovery is in general a natural arena for misconduct by lawyers.
However, the civility movement is positively harmful if norms of
civility are understood as precluding challenges to injustices within the
legal system. As one of my former colleagues, a committed advocate
for capital defendants, was constantly reminding us, many civility
codes would prohibit a defense lawyer from alleging in open court that
a prosecution was racially biased, even if that claim was factually
supported. This same colleague was fond of paraphrasing a maxim
about journalists and applying it to lawyers; in his view, the job of the
12. W. William Hodes, Truthfulness and Honesty Among American Lawyers:
Perception, Reality, and the Professionalism Reform Initiative, 53 S.C. L. REV. 527,
538 (2002).
13. See CHIEF JUSTICES' ACTION PLAN, supra note 7, at 39, 53 (surveying state
bar definitions of professionalism and concluding that "[b]y far, the most common
definition of professionalism related to the courtesy and respect that lawyers should
have for their clients, adverse parties, opposing counsel, the courts, court personnel,
witnesses, jurors and the public"); see also George Chapman, Remarks at the
Professionalism Conference in Charleston, South Carolina, Enhancing the
Accountability of Lawyers for Unprofessional Conduct (Sept. 28, 2002), in Transcript,
54 S.C. L. REV. 897, 907 (2003).
14. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34
(Del. 1994); see also Veasey Remarks, supra note 3, at 897 (discussing
professionalism and ethics standards). But see Teagle Remarks, supra note 4, at 920
(commenting that the Florida Bar Center for Professionalism was careful not to equate
professionalism exclusively with manners or civility).
10312003]
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lawyer is to "comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable." 5
Afflicting the comfortable is not always pleasant and may result in
accusations of incivility by the comfortable. To turn the point around,
effective lawyering may require nastiness, not civility.16 For this
reason, the question we should be addressing is the deeper ethical
issue of the possible justification of adversarial conduct, not simply
eliding that difficulty by exhorting lawyers to follow a creed of
professionalism centered on courtesy, civility, respect, and dignity.
One theme of the professionalism literature has been that the
public's image of the legal profession is at an all-time low or in a state
of crisis, which is caused by the unprofessional behavior of some
lawyers. Indeed, it is hard to find an article on professionalism that
does not begin with a lament about lawyerjokes, survey data revealing
popular distrust of lawyers, or the decline in professional values as
compared with some past golden age. 7 Improve professionalism, runs
the argument, and lawyers will regain the public's trust and
approbation, as well as enjoy more satisfying careers in the law. In my
view, that aspect of the professionalism movement is misguided, and
chasing after the public's trust and confidence is the wrong way to go
about addressing issues of professional conduct. Rather, the better
approach would be to reason critically from the nature and function of
the legal profession to a set of duties or dispositions that characterize
the ethical practice of law. Some public criticism may remain; indeed,
it may be the case that the involvement by lawyers in highly contested
normative debates makes it impossible to escape the wrath of at least
15. The original quote is attributed to Finley Peter Dunne in BARTLETT'S
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 602 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992). Dunne wrote in the
name of his character, the voluble, Irish-American barkeeper, Mr. Dooley, in Chicago
newspapers and made his name in a series of columns opposing the Spanish-American
War.
16. Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism," 41
EMORY L.J. 403, 420 (1992).
17. Citations could be multiplied ad infinitum, but for a representative sample,
see James Coleman, Jr., Professionalism Within the Profession, 65 TEX. B.J. 926, 926
(2002); Karen M. Raby, Professionalism in the Classroom andBeyond, GA. B.J., Aug.
2000, at 77. One sociologist's study of the rhetoric of bar leaders throughout most of
the first half of the twentieth century reveals that this theme was sounded consistently
during that period. See Rayman Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal
Professionalism, 1925-1960, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES, supra note
5, at 144. For a comprehensive critique of the behavior of lawyers and the organized
bar that is refreshingly sensitive to both history and contemporary social scientific
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some of the public, some of the time.' 8 Therefore, in the next section
of this Essay, I will first examine reasons why we should not be overly
concerned about public opinion polls, lawyer jokes, negative
stereotyping of lawyers (like Jim Carrey's character in Liar, Liar),9
and other popular attacks on the profession. I am not taking the
position that everything is rosy with the legal profession, and all that
is needed is some kind of public relations campaign to get ordinary
folks to see how wonderful lawyers are, how much pro bono service
they provide, and how essential lawyers are to our constitutional
democracy. In fact, it may be the case that the legal profession is
failing to measure up to standards of professionalism. However, the
point I wish to underscore is that these standards cannot be supplied
by public praise or criticism, but should be the product of critical
reflection on the ethical responsibilities of lawyers. Accordingly, in the
concluding section, I will briefly set out a model of professionalism
that can serve as the starting point for measuring professionalism and
increasing accountability for unprofessional conduct.
II.
There are a number of reasons why lawyers should stop worrying
about lawyer-bashing. (Loving it is a different matter-one would
have to share my understanding of the role of the lawyer in society.)
In a nutshell, it is just not the case that the public's affection for
lawyers is at an all-time low, or that lawyer professionalism is in a
historic nadir. Measured against a critical ethical baseline, most
lawyers, most of the time, do just fine. Why, then, is there such a
persistent sense of crisis in the commentary on lawyer
professionalism? One problem is that lawyers writing about
professionalism tend to read survey data superficially. It is true that
when people are asked about lawyers in the aggregate, they frequently
characterize lawyers as dishonest, unethical, or untrustworthy. For
example, a recent survey conducted by Columbia Law School revealed
that thirty-nine percent of respondents believed lawyers are "especially
or somewhat dishonest" and forty-one percent believe lawyers "do
18. In seventeenth-century Massachusetts, the Puritan government banned
lawyers, reasoning that because only one side in a dispute could have the truth on its
side, lawyers must represent the Devil as often as they represented God. ELLIOTT A.
KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUILDS: PROFESSIONS, STATES, AND THE ADVANCE OF
CAPITALISM, 1930 TO THE PRESENT, at 49 (1996).
19. Liar, Liar (Universal Pictures, 1997).
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more harm than good."2 However, when people who have used
lawyers are asked whether they are satisfied with their own lawyer's
performance, large majorities report that they are "very satisfied" or
"somewhat satisfied" with their lawyer.21 A consistent theme in survey
data is that people tend to think that "'lawyers generally work very
hard to protect the interests of their clients"' but that they distrust the
power of lawyers and believe they have a deleterious effect on the
national economy.
22
An explanation for this finding is that if they were in any sort of
trouble, people would want a single-minded, loyal representative who
puts her client's interests first, regardless of the effect of this
partisanship on others; however, when considering the effect of these
adversarial relationships on the community as a whole or the economic
costs of partisanship, people are more circumspect and voice
displeasure with lawyers.23 The positions taken by lawyers are not
necessarily in the public interest, but from the standpoint of an
individual with a legal problem, that is exactly what is praiseworthy
about lawyers. Thus, when a person is evaluating lawyers from the
perspective of a client or potential client, her evaluation is likely to be
positive based on the lawyer's responsibility to be a loyal
representative of the client, as against the rest of the world. However,
when a person is judging from the perspective of an affected member
of the public, it is precisely this quality of partiality and loyalty that is
disturbing. This deep structural dichotomy is likely to inspire distrust,
even revulsion, 4 in the public, but it does not follow from the mere
existence of a pervasive negative response to lawyers that this
sentiment is.justified.
Similarly, many bar leaders claim to lament the win-at-all-costs
mentality they perceive taking over the profession, 25 but I would be
20. Columbia Law Survey, Lawyers and the Legal Profession (April 2002),
http://www.law.columbia.edu/news/surveys/surveyopinionindex.shtml (providing
detailed survey results and descriptions of the methodology).
21. Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public
Opinion, Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805,808 (1998) (footnote
omitted).
22. Id. at 809-10 (footnotes omitted).
23. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Legal Profession and the Public Image of
Lawyers, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 51, 60-63 (1999).
24. For a fascinating explanation of public revulsion, created by the necessity of
a lawyer simultaneously playing a role and denying that she is acting, see Robert C.
Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75 CAL. L.
REv. 379, 387-89 (1987).
25. See, e.g., Ernest Borunda, Remarks at the Professionalism Conference in
Charleston, South Carolina, Enhancing the Accountability of Lawyers for
Unprofessional Conduct (Sept. 28, 2002), in Transcript, 54 S.C. L. Rev. 897, 903
1034
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surprised if any of these commentators would admit to going less than
all out for a client. To the charge of neglecting the public interest, this
hypothetical bar leader would probably respond that she is justified in
vigorously protecting the client's interests, and that the public's
interests will be better served by partisan, adversarial presentation of
the opponents' cases than by each side's lawyer serving as a kind of
freelance judge of the client's case. (I am assuming a litigated dispute,
rather than a transactional, counseling, or planning matter. The
adversarial ethic has always been less suited to instances in which no
neutral referee exists to evaluate the parties' positions.) This defense
of the adversarial ethic is so familiar that it hardly needs elaboration.
26
Despite rigorous academic criticism, 27 the conception of legal ethics
as "zealous advocacy within the bounds of the law" remains dominant
within the practicing bar. Thus, it is always ironic to hear successful
lawyers complaining about the "gladiator" or "hired gun" mentality
they observe among their fellows. That is exactly the mindset that is
drilled into the consciences of newly minted lawyers, and all the
mentoring and gap-bridging programs in the world will not make
junior lawyers any more attentive to the public interest as long as the
great majority of lawyers believes that the public interest is best served
by partisanship and adversarial presentation of cases.
Interestingly, survey data seems to confirm that the public regards
lawyers as appropriately adversarial; in one survey conducted for the
ABA, a remarkable eighty percent of respondents characterized the
justice system in the United States as "the best in the world."2 It is
hard to believe that large majorities could regard lawyers as
unprofessional or unethical, yet maintain that the system, of which
they are an essential part, is the best in the world. The most plausible
explanation is that people have internalized a kind of bifurcated
expectation of lawyers, in which they are simultaneously fascinated
and disturbed by the same set of characteristics. The criticism of
(2003) (discussing his perspective as a judge).
26. See RHODE, supra note 17, at 53-58 (criticizing the adversarial ethic).
27. In addition to countless articles, there are several book-length arguments from
a variety of philosophical andjurisprudential perspectives criticizing this conception.
See, e.g., ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES (1999); MARVIN E.
FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980); MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER
LAWYERS (1994); RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND
PROFESSIONALDECISIONS (1989); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993);
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE (1988); RHODE, supra note 17; WILLIAM H.
SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE (1999).
28. Public Understanding and Perceptions of the U.S. Justice System, A.B.A.
sponsored survey and report prepared by M/MR/C/ Research #58 (presented Feb.
1999). I am grateful to Andy Perlman for this reference.
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lawyers is grounded in the perceived access of lawyers to political and
economic power, their ability to manipulate language and evidence,
the barriers to entry denying nonlawyers access to professional
mysteries, and the seemingly uncanny ability of lawyers to advocate
passionately for positions they personally oppose.29 But these are
exactly the qualities that lead people to seek out lawyers when their
interests collide with those of other individuals or the state.
There is no escape from public criticism because, in an adversarial
system, someone's interests are always affected by the effective
assertion of the opponent's legal entitlements by a competent lawyer.
As Ronald Rotunda puts it:
People dislike us because we are guns for hire who
manipulate the legal system, but they like us because
we fight for our clients, protect their rights, and cut
through bureaucratic red tape. When we fight
zealously for our client, file lawsuits, and cut
through red tape we do good, but when we fight
zealously for our client, file lawsuits, and manipulate
the legal system, we do bad. We receive accolades
and denunciations for doing the same thing.3"
An alternative way to explain this simultaneous praise and
criticism is that lawyers are the only profession called upon to serve
people in a gray zone of moral ambiguity and conflict, where the
nature of the relationship between the individual and society is
contested.3 Because legal professionals must operate in a domain
where evaluative criteria are being fought over, there is no baseline
measure of the "health" of the legal profession. Criteria that could be
used to judge whether the profession is functioning
adequately-distributional considerations, the proper balance of
competing rights and interests, and conceptions of justice-are
precisely what the opposing parties in legal conflicts are contesting.3
2
For example, to the extent lawyers are blamed for contributing to
a "litigation explosion," we have to ask whether there is a problem
29. See WALTER BENNETT, THE LAWYER'S MYTH 65-67 (2001).
30. Rotunda, supra note 23, at 61.
31. "[L]awyering as a profession exists largely because of moral ambiguity, not
to resolve it." Terrell & Wildman, supra note 16, at 407.
32. Id. at 406-08.
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with excessive litigation and, if so, what the causes are.33 Perhaps the
fear over groundless lawsuits, runaway juries, greedy ambulance-
chasing lawyers, and a resulting chilling effect on innovation is being
stoked by business and political elites who resist the shift in power
toward consumers that has been accomplished by the tort system in the
last several decades.34 Naturally, the converse could also be true-that
greedy personal-injury lawyers are stirring up frivolous litigation,
blithely unconcerned about its effect on the availability of useful
products or services. Without taking sides in this debate, let us assume
that some accidents are the fault of someone other than the injured
person, and in those cases, the victim would be legally entitled to
recover compensation from the tortfeasor. To the extent the plaintiff's
lawyer is doing her job well, the defendant will not be happy because
an effective lawyer increases the likelihood that the plaintiff will
obtain damages at trial. If we aggregate these cases, we can see how
the interests of businesses that are frequently sued would be adversely
affected by competent, ethical, professional lawyers, as long as legal
entitlements generally favored accident victims. Similarly, if legal
entitlements are slanted toward defendants, we would expect to hear
criticism of lawyers from consumer groups that decry the protection
of businesses from liability costs. Thus, whether or not the tort system
is just, a great deal of lawyer-bashing might be explicable on the basis
of lawyers behaving exactly as they are supposed to behave.
In any event, it is disappointing to see anecdotes and folk myths
about the effect of unprofessional behavior by lawyers uncritically
recounted in the professionalism literature. For example, the ABA's
33. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 MD. L. REV.
274, 276-88 (1986) (acknowledging reformists' claims of undue litigiousness, but
questioning whether a problem truly exists, what the causes might actually be, and
calling on these reformists to put forward substantive rhetoric and significant reform
proposals).
34. The most useful scholarship on this question comes from legal sociologist
Marc Galanter, who has extensively studied both the legal profession and the tort
system and clearly has shown the connections between political discourse on liability
and the public's perception of lawyers. In addition to work cited separately, see Marc
Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81
TEX. L. REV. 285 (2002); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46
MD. L. REV. 3 (1986). Interestingly, one recent survey commissioned by the Minority
Corporate Counsel Association found that eighty-five percent of respondents believed
that companies hide dangers associated with their products until the government or a
lawsuit forces them to tell the truth. John Gibeaut, Fear and Loathing in Corporate
America, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2003, at 50, 52-53. This finding suggests that the general
public is not hostile to the tort system, or at least is ambivalent, owing to the
recognition that lawsuits can serve an important public-safety function.
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Stanley Commission Report refers to a laundry-list of complaints
against lawyers by the general public:
Many individuals blame lawyers for the huge
increase in medical malpractice litigation, with a
concomitant sharp increase in the costs of insurance
protection .... Many blame lawyers when public
playgrounds and sports programs are threatened with
a loss of liability insurance and may be forced to
discontinue use of facilities for recreational
activities. 5
The report on professionalism does not stop to consider whether
blaming these problems on lawyers is warranted. A great deal of
systematic empirical scholarship exists that scrutinizes the support for
many of these beliefs about lawyers and the civil justice system, and
many of the horror stories supporting the public's disgust with lawyers
turn out to be either without foundation in fact, or unrepresentative of
the vast majority of civil cases.36 The story about the psychic who
recovered damages in a medical malpractice suit after a CAT scan
allegedly destroyed her psychic powers conveniently ignores the fact
that the trial judge granted the defendant's motion for a new trial and
the plaintiff's case was dismissed on retrial.37 Similarly, the infamous
McDonald's coffee case turns out to be much more nuanced than the
usual way it is retold as an example of lawyers run amok. The plaintiff
was hospitalized for eight days after suffering third-degree bums from
coffee that was served at temperatures far in excess of those necessary
for good-tasting coffee; McDonald's had been warned by medical
experts to lower the temperature of its coffee, but had refused despite
having settled some 700 other bum cases; and it similarly refused to
settle the New Mexico case for payment of medical expenses totaling
$11 ,0 0 0 .3
8 There very well may be a problem with greedy lawyers or
frivolous litigation, but neither of these anecdotes, which are repeated
often in the popular media, show any systematic relationship between
unprofessional conduct by lawyers and increased costs for desirable
goods or services.
Another reason to be skeptical about the claims of all-time low
levels of public regard for the legal profession is that the public's
35. STANLEY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 5, at 253.
36. Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the
Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 726 (1998).
37. Id. at 726-28.
38. RHODE, supra note 17, at 122.
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mistrust of lawyers is not a new phenomenon. We are all familiar with
the "Woe to you lawyers... !" diatribe from the Gospel of Luke,39 but
perhaps less well acquainted with the history of the public's perception
of lawyers in the United States. In the Colonial, early Republican, and
Jacksonian periods, revulsion of lawyers exceeded anything we are
experiencing today.4" Prior to the American Revolution, attorneys
were regarded as an adjunct to an unpopular and corrupt government,
in a conspiracy to suppress the rights of the colonists, and obstacles to
peace or godly government.4 Public criticism of lawyers played up
themes that would be familiar in a twenty-first-century professionalism
symposium: greedy lawyers exploit technicalities, prey on the
misfortunes of their fellow citizens, serve the rich at the expense of
everyone else, and form an undemocratic elite.42 In fact, the only thing
unique about the public perception of lawyers today is that it follows
upon an extraordinary period of acclaim for lawyers-the civil rights
movement-in which the law was by and large viewed positively as
an instrument for beneficial social change.43 The collapse of public
trust in legal and political authority which followed Vietnam and
Watergate certainly brought lawyers lower in the public's regard, but
it is incorrect to assume that the image of the legal profession is at an
all-time low.
If we narrow the scope of the professionalism critique and
concentrate on only one aspect of unprofessional conduct by lawyers,
it is still the case that very little new can be said. For example,
consider the complaint that the practice of law has degenerated from
a noble profession to a "mere" business or trade.44 Looking first at the
"decline and fall" aspect of that claim, it is clear that complaints about
money-grubbing and inappropriate, business-like behavior have
39. Luke 11:46-52.
40. Galanter, supra note 21, at 810-11.
41. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 94-97 (1985).
42. Id. at 303-04.
43. Galanter, supra note 21, at 811. Even the civil rights movement was not a
time of universally praiseworthy behavior by lawyers. State and local bar associations
throughout the South defended "Nordic, White Protestant, Anglo-Saxon Christian
values." Most Southern lawyers refused to represent civil rights advocates, and bar
associations fought vigorously against the efforts of out-of-state lawyers to provide
representation to black clients. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS
AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 264-66 (1976).
44. See, e.g., RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LAWYERS, COURTS, AND PROFESSIONALISM
23 (1989) (discussing the failure of lawyers to meet their professionalism
responsibilities); MICHAEL H. TROTrER, PROFIT AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW: WHAT'S
HAPPENED TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1997) (describing the transformation of the
legal profession); Norman Bowie, The Law: From a Profession to a Business, 41
VAND. L. REV. 741 (1988) (discussing the transformation of the practice of law).
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always trailed lawyers. A great deal of internal professional
disciplinary activity has always been directed either against non-
lawyers seeking to encroach on professional turf, or against lower-
status lawyers by elite members of the corporate bar, often to enforce
rules, such as the prohibition on solicitation that served to protect the
economic interests of the elite.45 And there has always been criticism
of lawyers either for their own wealth or for the wealth of their clients,
presuming that the interests of the rich are inimical to those of the
public at large.46 The influential nineteenth-century legal ethics treatise
written by George Sharswood laments the decline of the legal
profession "from an honorable office to a money-making trade. '47 In
fact, Russell Pearce describes an "'extraordinary outpouring of
rhetoric"' in the nineteenth century decrying the erosion of
professional ideals--defined in part as indifference to financial self-
interest-and their replacement by commercialism or profit-seeking by
lawyers.4" It may be the case that there are greedy lawyers or maybe
even that a majority oflawyers are greedy, but to take public criticism
seriously would require believing that the profession has been in a
continuous state of decline since the first lawyer was created. Rather
than taking our cues from this kind of implausible public perception,
the professionalism movement should be oriented toward a critical
analysis of the concept of professionalism and solid empirical research
into performance of lawyers in the aggregate.
One of the achievements of the jointly sponsored South Carolina
- Stanford conferences has been to require exactly this kind of
reasoning from participants in the professionalism discussion. It also
makes a great deal of sense to take a more finely grained approach to
each of the component parts of professionalism-law school
education, continuing legal education, transition to practice and
"bridging the gap" programs, civility, access to justice, alternative
45. FRIEDMAN, supra note 41, at 634-35; KRAUSE, supra note 18, at 54;
Solomon, supra note 17. As Richard Abel and others have pointed out, restrictions on
solicitation are seldom enforced to prohibit practices by which large law firms
establish ties with clients and obtain business, such as serving on corporation boards.
See ABEL, supra note 5, at 119-20.
46. FRIEDMAN, supra note 41, at 639-40.
47. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 73 (1854).
48. Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding
Professional Ideology WillImprove the Conduct and Reputation ofthe Bar, 70 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1229, 1241 (1995) (quoting Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual
Law": Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW
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dispute resolution, and so on.49 The "big tent" approach to
professionalism may reflect the diversity of concerns shared by
observers of the legal profession, but it makes it difficult to move
beyond foundational issues such as the definition of professionalism
and the identification of problems. As a result of these efforts, we may
be hopeful that the quality of the debate over professionalism will
improve.
III.
The previous section argued that we ought to stop worrying about
lawyer-bashing. It has always been with us, has often been worse, and
is inevitable given the lawyer's role as the means by which normative
conflicts are settled in a complex, pluralistic society. As legal historian
Lawrence Friedman observes, lawyers are natural lightning rods,
drawing public ire during contentious public debate.5" Continuing the
Dr. Strangelove theme, then, is it possible to love this role, in the sense
of committing to it as a professional ideal? The answer depends on a
critical ethical analysis of what duties lawyers owe to their own
clients, to tribunals and the system ofjustice, to affected third parties,
and to the public at large. If those obligations are worthy of moral
respect, then we have an ideal of lawyer professionalism to which we
can commit ourselves. Once this ideal is in place, we can identify
deviations from it and devise means to enhance the accountability of
lawyers for unprofessional behavior.
One ideal of professionalism, drawing from both sociology and
professional ethics, is the Brandeisian vision described by William
Simon in an influential article and in his book, The Practice of
Justice.51 On this account, the lawyer's role is not simply to represent
a client, the consequences to all others be damned. Of course, the
lawyer is a representative of clients and is partisan to some extent, but
the Brandeisian ideal imagines that a lawyer worthy of the title of
professional will not completely disregard the public interest.52 In this
sense, a client is a "special interest" (pejoratively used to refer to
"special interest legislation"), not necessarily someone acting in
accordance with the norms of the society.53 Society does not recognize
49. See Deborah Rhode, Defining the Challenges of Professionalism: Access to
Law and Accountability of Lawyers, 54 S.C. L. REV. 889 (2003).
50. FRIEDMAN, supra note 41, at 96.
51. SIMON, supra note 27, at 120-37; William H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis:
The Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565 (1985).
52. See SIMON, supra note 27, at 568.
53. Solomon, supra note 17, at 152.
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the role of lawyers to permit individuals to pursue their own self-
interest without regard to the deleterious effects on social ordering;
rather, lawyers exist to interpret and apply the esoteric, specialized
body of law, which is inaccessible to lay people, with a view toward
fitting the client's ends together with broader social ends. When
Justice Louis Brandeis was in private practice, he understood himself
as "counsel for the situation," whose job it was to use his influence
with powerful clients to ensure that they did not pursue "unjust or
antisocial projects" and that they sought mutually beneficial solutions
to disputes with adversaries. 4 This ideal is also expressed in the often-
quoted maxim of Elihu Root, finding that half of the job of a decent
lawyer is telling his clients they are damned fools and should stop.55
Significantly, this mechanism of social ordering is an
improvement over the principal alternative-the classical liberal vision
of self-interested actors pursuing material advantage constrained only
by coercively enforced, impersonal legal rules:
The job of the lawyer, who knows the law and is
spontaneously disposed toward compliance, is to
teach the client and to encourage him to comply. The
lawyer is in a better position to do so than is the
government bureaucrat because the lawyer can
establish a relation of relative trust and intimacy with
the client that enables the lawyer to relate abstract
legal principles to the client's concrete
circumstances, to detect incipient deviance, and to
persuade the client.1
6
Therefore, professionalism is opposed to the pursuit of one's narrow
self-interest, both for the professional, who is expected to be motivated
by considerations other than acquiring material wealth, and for the
client, who employs the professional with the understanding that the
agent's role is constrained by the necessity of respecting the public
interest.
I trust that it is not too much of an exaggeration to observe that
this conception of professionalism is a complete non-starter with most
lawyers. Lawyers resist nothing more fiercely than the notion that they
are responsible for constructing a conception of the public good and
attempting to conform their clients' ends to that standard. To illustrate,
54. SIMON, supra note 27, at 128-29.
55. GLENDON, supra note 27, at 37 (quoting the maxim of Elihu Root).
56. SIMON, supra note 27, at 572-73.
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consider the debate over the "noisy withdrawal" requirement in the
SEC's proposed regulations implementing Section 307 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley corporate responsibility legislation. Briefly, the
proposed regulations require a lawyer for an issuer of publicly traded
securities to report evidence of a material violation of the securities
laws "up the ladder" within the corporation-first to the chief legal
officer of the client, then to the audit committee of the board of
directors or to the full board.58 If the lawyer is unsuccessfil in
persuading higher authorities within the corporation to correct the
violation, she maybe required to withdraw from representing the client
and, in doing so, notify the SEC of the fact of withdraw and disaffirm
any statements she may have participated in preparing.59 This is the so-
called noisy withdrawal requirement. The regulations also expand a
lawyer's authority to reveal confidential information in some
circumstances, bringing the law governing the duty of confidentiality
into line with the majority ofjurisdictions.6"
In my view, the regulations are largely consistent with the existing
law governing lawyers, particularly in the up the ladder and noisy
withdrawal requirements, and in the authority to disclose confidential
information in some cases.6 The law in these cases recognizes a
circumscribed domain in which the lawyer acts ever-so-slightly in a
Brandeisian role. By disclosing client confidences in these few cases,
the lawyer can prevent harm to investors more effectively than by
preserving the client's confidences and trying to persuade the client to
rectify the fraud. The permission to noisily withdraw is limited to cases
57. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed.
Reg. 71,670 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205); Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
58. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed.
Reg. at 71,681.
59. Id. at 71,688.
60. Id. at 71,692. Both the 1983 and the 2002 versions of Rule 1.6 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct would prohibit disclosure under some circumstances in
which disclosure is permitted by the proposed regulations, but this rule has not been
adopted in its "model" form in most states. For details, see the extremely helpful chart
on ethics rules on client confidences, prepared by Attorneys' Liability Assurance
Society, reprinted in SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 161
(Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda eds., 2003).
61. Fifty-one law professors, myself included, signed a comment letter to the
SEC, prepared by Susan Koniak, Roger Cramton, and George Cohen, essentially
supporting the SEC's approach, but suggesting some improvements in the language of
the regulations. The electronic record of the comments is available from the SEC's
website. See Letter from Susan P. Koniak, Professor of Law, Boston University School
of Law, et al., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission
(Dec. 17, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/spkoniakl.htm.
2003] 1043
17
Wendel: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Lawyer-Bashing: Some Post
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1027
in which the fraud is ongoing and the client has used the lawyer's
services to commit the fraud.62
However, even this highly unusual case is too much direct action
in the public interest for the corporate and securities bar. This group
maintains the traditional view that a strong rule of confidentiality,
prohibiting disclosure in these cases, is necessary to maintain the
relationship of trust between clients and their lawyers, which in turn
is necessary to enable the lawyer to counsel the client to comply with
the law. These lawyers reacted strongly against the proposed
regulations, perceiving a threat to the essentially private (or liberal-
positivist, in Simon's terms) nature of the attomey-client relationship.
The comments of seventy-seven prominent corporate law firms
expressed concern that the new regulations would "drive a wedge
between client and the counsel who advised it on a matter" and could
"chill a lawyer's energetic representation of his or her client."63
Debevoise & Plimpton worried that "the Commission would be using
the attorney as the Commission's eyes and ears to build a case against
the client."64 Sullivan and Cromwell resists the requirement that
lawyers "police and pass judgment on their clients."65 Clifford Chance
makes the standard argument about the importance of candor in the
attorney-client relationship:
[The regulations] would impair the very relationship
between attorneys and issuers that enables them to
exert the influence that Section 307 seeks to
promote. Faced with the possibility that attorneys
who discover possible problems may have to
disclose the existence of problems to the
Commission or others, companies would do
everything they could to be sure attorneys do not
62. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 366 (1992)
(discussing the prerequisites for a noisy withdrawal); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 10 (2002) (approving of withdrawals in the 2002
version); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (1983) (approving of
withdrawals in the 1983 version).
63. Letter from seventy-seven law firms to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary,
Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 18, 2002),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/ 77lawfirmsl.htm (last visited Jan. 9,
2003).
64. Letter from Debevoise & Plimpton to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and
Exchange Commission (Dec. 1 8, 2002),
http://www.sec.gov/niles/proposed/s74502/debevoisel.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2003).
65. Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission (Dec. 18, 2002),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/ sullivanl.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2003).
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discover anything they might view as evidence of
problems. The frankness by company personnel that
lets attorneys make judgements on matters such as
disclosure requirements and corporate
responsibilities would inevitably be substantially
reduced.66
The tenor of the comments from affected lawyers could not be
further from the vision of professionals as mediators between public
and private interests. The securities lawyers strongly resist any
interference with strong norms of confidentiality and loyalty, which
conceive of the lawyer as responsible solely to protect the client's
interests, subject only to the obligation not to counsel or assist
violations of law. The bar readily accepts the classical liberal
conception of self-interested actors pursuing material advantage
constrained only by enforceable legal rules. The alternative to the
Brandeisian conception of professionalism, and the sort of watchdog
role that critics of the SEC regulations wrongly assume is being
imposed on them is a vision of lawyering in which the lawyer's only
ethical obligations are to serve as an effective, diligent representative
of the client's interests, constrained only by enforceable legal norms
and the lawyer's own aspirations to practice law in a particularly
competent, courteous, respectful manner. Ironically, it seems to be
exactly that model of partisan lawyering that attracts the public's ire.
Given this tension, lawyers thinking about professionalism have a
choice-either agree that public criticism is legitimate and move
toward a more public-spirited conception of representation, or persist
in doing what they take to be the right thing and accept that some
negative opinion polls and lawyerjokes are just the price that must be
paid for serving as a loyal representative of one party where normative
issues may be contested.
Even if lawyers collectively dedicate themselves to either a
private, adversarial conception of representation or a more public-
spirited, Brandeisian vision, many problems under the umbrella
concept of professionalism remain. Perhaps law schools should spend
more time teaching practical skills such as law office management.
Additionally, continuing legal education should be improved,
mentoring programs should be developed, and lawyers should be
encouraged to perform pro bono service. However, from what I know
66. Letter from Clifford Chance to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and
Exchange Commission (Dec. 1 8, 2002),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/cliffordl .htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2003).
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of the survey data, these are not the deficiencies complained of by the
public. Most lawyer jokes and negative responses to polls do not focus
on lawyers failing to return phone calls or being sloppy drafters.
Rather, criticism is directed at lawyers as fomenters of strife, economic
parasites who profit from the troubles of others, untrustworthy
characters who can espouse positions they do not personally believe
in, and people with power by virtue of having access to the arcane
mysteries of law.67 One can criticize the excessive loyalty to clients
and the indifference to harms to others inherent in the dominant
conception of legal ethics, but unless one is prepared to make a
wholesale change in the moral foundations of the lawyer's role, it is
only natural that the public will be both fascinated and repulsed by a
profession dedicated to taking sides in disputes that touch on profound
normative questions. The professionalism movement can benefit by
moving beyond its excessive concern with lawyer bashing and
refocusing on either reforming, or learning to love, the role of lawyer.
67. See Galanter, supra note 21, at 810.
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